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COMMENT

Regulation of Electric Utilities and
Affiliated Coal CompaniesDetermining Reasonable Expenses
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing trend among utility companies toward diversification
into utility and non-utility related businesses. ' Investor-owned utility companies that diversify into businesses involved in some aspect of providing
utility services present complex regulatory issues. This comment addresses the statutory and rate-making issues raised in state commission
regulation of the relationship between the utility and its functionallyrelated affiliate.
The comment focuses on problems arising in regulation of investorowned electric utilities that purchase coal from an affiliate. Analysis is
limited to western coal mines located at the base of electric generating
stations, because these mine-mouth operations involve a number of common considerations such as coal quality, transmission, and transportation
costs. 2
The comment begins with a brief explanation of the mechanics of public
utility regulation. It then illustrates the particular issues involved in regulation of the relationship between the utility and its affiliate through a
recent New Mexico case, Att'y Gen. of N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm' n. 3
The comment next analyzes other jurisdictions that utilize either a market
price rate-making methodology or a rate of return methodology to determine the reasonableness of utility/affiliate expenses. The cases show
that commissions and courts are modifying both methodologies according
to the circumstances presented in the particular case. The last part of the
comment explores reasons for these modifications and suggests justifications for this trend.
1. See D. Watkiss, Utility Diversification and Federal Rate Regulation of Inter-Affiliate Transactions, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 1, 2-4 (1982); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL
INDUSTRY: PURSUANT TO SECTION 8 OF THE FEDERAL COAL LEASING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1975, GPO
027-000-00678-7 110 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY]; A HighRisk Era for the Utilities, Business Week, Feb. 23, 1981, at 76.
2. Even though the differences between eastern and western coal operations are well documented,
utility companies continue to compare the operations for rate-making purposes. See Att'y Gen. of
N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 549, 552, 685 P.2d 957, 960 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as AG v. NMPSC], where the court refers to the exhibit presented by Public Service Company
of New Mexico at administrative hearings below, in support of the reasonableness of its expenses.
See infra, note 44.
3. 101 N.M. 549, 685 P.2d 957 (1984).
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS
All states have agencies that regulate public utilities within the state.
For example, in New Mexico, both the Public Service Commission and
the State Corporation Commission regulate public utilities. The New
Mexico state legislature created the New Mexico Public Service Commission (NMPSC); 4 the State Corporation Commission was constitutionally created.' In New Mexico, the governor, with the advice and consent
of the state senate, appoints three Public Service Commissioners who
each serve six-year terms.6
Public service commissions are vested with the responsibility of balancing the public interest, the interests of consumers in receiving adequate
service at a reasonable rate and the interests of the utility company in
maintaining financial stability and attracting new investment. 7 State legislatures grant public service commissions the authority to establish just
and reasonable rates.
A guiding regulatory principle for commission determination of utility
rates is the public's right to have dependable utility service at a reasonable
charge, balanced against the utility company's right to earn a fair rate of
return.' As part of the rate-making process, commissions must review
costs incurred by utility companies to determine the rates which may be
charged to consumers. However, commissions usually feel constrained
in their ability to regulate a utility's affiliate companies. 9 It is uncommon
for a commission to be granted authority to regulate the activities of a
subsidiary or affiliate.' 0
Although most states do not grant commissions any express authority
to regulate affiliates, statutory language provides commissions some authority to consider the affiliate's activities for rate-making purposes. New
N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-5-1 (1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-5-1 (1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-5-3 (1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-3-1(B) (1978).
See A.J.G. PRIEST, 1 PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 4 (1969), quoting J. Swidler:
This system is designed to protect consumers against exploitation where competition is
inherently unavailable or inadequate, and to insure that these industries will serve the
public interest. At the same time it provides these companies necessary assurance of an
opportunity to earn a reasonable return on their investment and to attract capital for
expansion.
For example, the New Mexico Public Service Commission has authority to regulate utility companies in order to ensure that proper utility service is provided at fair, just, and reasonable rates.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-1(B) (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4 (1978).
9. See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4(C) (1978).
10. The State of Washington is an unusual example of a state in which the commission has express
authority to regulate a utility's transactions with its affiliates. The utility is required to receive prior
commission approval for its transactions with affiliates, and the commission has authority to subsequently disallow any unreasonable expenses paid by the utility to affiliates. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 80.16.010-.090 (1962); see also infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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Mexico, for example, gives the commission "general and exclusive power
and jurisdiction to regulate and supervise every public utility in respect
to its rates . . . and to do all things necessary and convenient in the
exercise of its power and jurisdiction."" The NMPSC also has authority,
for good cause shown, to review books and records of the affiliate. 2
Regulation and determination of utility rates require commission determination of the utility company's revenue requirements. 3 A commission determines revenue requirements by considering 1) a utility's operating
expenses and 2) the rate base, or the assets upon which the utility is
entitled to earn a return, combined with 3) a fair rate of return. 4 Operating
expenses include such factors as plant, fuel, labor and management costs,
and taxes.'" The rate base is determined by a calculation of securities
(such as debt, stocks, and bonds) or assets (such as physical plant, distribution, transmission, and generation), less depreciation and other adjustments. 6 The rate of return represents the profit which the commission
permits a utility to earn; this percentage figure is combined with the rate
base to set a reasonable return for the utility.'7 The reasonable return is
combined with the utility's operating costs to arrive at the utility's revenue
requirements.
In New Mexico, the NMPSC sets a hearing when a utility company
files for a rate increase.' 8 The proceeding is adversarial; parties to the
proceeding present evidence in favor of their respective positions. The
utility company represents its own interest, and the Attorney General,
for example, intervenes as a representative of the interests of residential
ratepayers or the state of New Mexico as a whole. Other interests, such
as industrial consumers, have independent representation. A hearing examiner generally sits through the proceedings and makes a recommendation to the commissioners, who make the final decision. '9 Appeals of
NMPSC decisions are made directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court.20
The appeal is made on the record of the proceeding before the commission,
including such items as transcripts, exhibits, pleadings, findings, and
11.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4(A) (1978).
STAT. ANN. §62-6-17 (1978).
13. Another important regulatory issue in setting rates is determination of rate structure. Rate
design is not directly implicated in regulation of transactions between a utility and its affiliate, and
is not a subject of this comment. For information on rate structure, see PRIEST, supra note 8, at
327-345; see also THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION, PUB. No. RM-607 47 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION].
14. PRIEST, supra note 8; ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION, supra note 13, at 25.
15. PRIEST, supra, note 8, at 139-190; ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION, supra, note 13, at 25, 28.
16. PRIEST, supra, note 8, at 139; ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION, supra, note 13, at 25.
17. PRIEST, supra, note 8, at 191-226.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-7 (1978); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-10-1 (1978).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-10-7 (1978).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-11-1 (1978).

12. N.M.
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opinions." The court may not modify the commission's decision, but
may annul, affirm or vacate the decision.22 Court review of NMPSC
decisions is limited to a determination of whether the commission: 1)
acted within its authority; 2) acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously;
and 3) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.23
DETERMINING REASONABLE RATES
When a utility company makes a necessary expenditure, such as for
purchase of fuel, it is assumed that a market price or competitive environment exists that allows the utility to find the best available price. Thus,
as a commercial actor, the utility is expected to incur a reasonable cost
in making the purchase. These costs, presumed reasonable, are part of
the revenue requirements of the utility which must be paid by consumers.
However, when a utility is vertically integrated with an affiliate in its
organizational structure,24 the purchase of fuel from its affiliate does not
necessarily represent an "arm's-length" transaction.25 The expenditure
may not reflect a reasonable cost. Therefore, because of the close relationship that exists between the utility and its affiliated company, regulatory commissions must carefully scrutinize the transactions in order to
determine whether expenses are reasonable. In a transaction not conducted
at ann's-length, one cannot presume the costs incurred are reasonable;
the utility must affirmatively demonstrate the reasonableness of its ex21. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§62-11-3; 62-11-2 (1978).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-11-5 (1978).
23. See Llano, Inc. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 75 N.M. 7, 399 P.2d 646 (1964); Public Service
Co. v. N.M. Public Service Comm'n., 92 N.M. 721, 594 P.2d 1177 (1979).
24. Definitions of "affiliate" differ among states. For example, in the context of utility regulation,
an affiliate in New Mexico is defined as an individual or corporation who "owns or holds, directly
or indirectly, ten percent or more of the voting securities of a public utility," or any individual or
corporation "ten percent or more of whose voting securities is owned, directly or indirectly, by a
public utility." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(A) (1978). The level of ownership interest that is deemed
an affiliate relationship varies among states. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.16.010 (1962),
where 5% ownership is an affiliated interest.
Other states, such as Washington, include as part of the definition of affiliated interest corporations
or individuals having a management or service contract with the utility company. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 80.16.010 (1962).
25. Arm's-length transaction is defined as "a transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each
acting in his or her own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination," BLACK'S LAW
DIc'riONARY 100 (5th ed. 1979).
One well-known treatise offers this comparison:
If there is a parent-subsidiary relationship or similar affiliation between the vendor of
commodities and a utility buyer, the agency having jurisdiction will examine the
transaction coldly, but if it is arm's-length and the price paid is within the realm of
reason, regulatory challenge is not likely.
PRIEST, supra note 8, at 82.
For a helpful discussion of effects of vertical integration and regulatory approaches within the
telephone industry, see Treatment of Affiliated Transactionsin Utility Rate Making: Western Electric
Company and the Bell System, 56 B.U.L. REV. 558 (1976).
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penses.26 In effect, the utility that transacts business with an affiliate must
meet a higher standard of proof of reasonableness than that required of
a utility transacting business with a non-affiliated company. The utility
must show more than actual expenditures; it must prove the reasonableness of those expenditures.
The purpose of imposing this higher burden is to safeguard against
illegitimate utility profits garnered through excessive payments to affiliates, payments that are ultimately made by utility consumers.27 Within
the context of coal resource development and competition in the coal
industry, the Department of Justice has recognized that vertical integration, absent commission control over pricing, may allow an electric utility
to evade regulatory limits on profits.2
Public service commissions are generally vested with wide discretion
in determining whether rates are just and reasonable.29 Generally, commissions are not required to use any single methodology for determining
rate base.3 However, the method chosen to analyze costs produces widely
different results. As one court said: "[t]his question of the reasonableness
of expenses paid to affiliates is one of the more perplexing problems
which arise in public utility rate regulation, and . . . it has received
differing treatment from different courts and utility commissions. "31
Commissions utilize two basic methods to assess the reasonableness
of costs. The cases discussed below indicate commissions and courts are
26. AG v. NMPSC, 101 N.M. 549, 685 P.2d 957 (1984); Boise Water Co. v. Idaho Pub. Serv.
Comm., 97 Idaho 832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976).
27. See e.g., PRIEST,, supra note 8, at 89-108; Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 454, 460 (1982).
28. The vertical integration of electric utilities into coal production . . .may provide an
opportunity to evade the effects of rate-of-return regulation. If a utility's electric
generating and distribution operations are subject to rate-of-return regulation, but no
check exists over the price the utility pays for coal provided by its own coal operations,
then the utility would be able to achieve the profits denied to it by rate-of-return
regulation. The utility could inflate the price charged for its own coal above a competitive level. This would raise the accounting costs to the regulated part of the utility,
and permit a higher price to be charged either through a rate redetermination hearing
or through an automatic fuel cost adjustment mechanism. This higher price will result
in reduced consumption of electric power and a transfer of income from the purchasers
of electricity to the utility. However, these additional "costs" to the regulated operations
would be additional profits to the firm's coal operations and the firm as a whole.
Potentially, the utility could achieve a price of electricity, and profit from electricity,
equivalent to that of an unregulated electric utility.
COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 114.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-6-4 (1978); State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315,
224 P.2d 155 (1950); Southern Union Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 330, 503
P.2d 310 (1972); Hobbs Gas Company v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 731, 616 P.2d 1116
(1980).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4 (1978); Mountain States Tel. v. N.M. Corp. Comm., 90 N.M.
325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977); Hobbs Gas Company v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 731, 616
P.2d 1116 (1980).
31. Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm., 101 Idaho 567, 617 P.2d
1242, 1248 (1980).
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deviating from a pure application of either method in regulating transactions between utilities and affiliates. However, it is instructive to note
the pure approaches as a backdrop to a description of the actual approaches
being taken.
One approach, called the "traditional", "market comparison" or "market price" method, analyzes prices within a competitive or market context.
The market price approach treats the affiliate as if it were an entity
independent from the utility company. This method compares prices relating to the transaction between utility and affiliate with those of comparable enterprises. If a regulatory commission does not find the affiliate's
prices comparable, it will impute a comparable price.32
The other approach, the "California" or "rate of return" method,
disregards any separate corporate identity of the affiliate, and the affiliate
is treated as an integral part of the utility company. This approach accepts
as a reasonable cost that which holds the affiliate, in its dealings with the
utility, to the same rate of profit as is permitted the utility company.33
Att'y Gen. of N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n: AN ILLUSTRATION
A New Mexico Supreme Court decision illustrates the problems associated with utility and affiliate transactions.34 Under New Mexico law,
a utility owning ten percent or more of the voting securities of a company
has an affiliate relationship with that company.' 5 The sale of coal (or other
fuels) by any affiliate to a utility for electricity generation is subject to
regulation by the NMPSC, "but only to the extent necessary to determine
that the cost to the utility of such coal, uranium or other fuels at the point
of sale is reasonable."36 The NMPSC is vested with considerable discretion in carrying out its regulatory responsibilities and is not required to
follow any single methodology in determining rate base.37 However, with
respect to affiliates, the NMPSC is not permitted to regulate the sale price
at the point where the fuel is produced.3" The NMPSC exercises its control
through determining what percentage of prices is passed on to ratepayers.
Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), an investor-owned
32. Id.
33. For example, if a utility company's permitted rate of return is 15%, the affiliate's transaction
with the utility company will also be held to a 15% rate of return. Since the commission can not
generally regulate the affiliate company itself, the utility company is held to the permitted rate of
return in its allowable expenses in the rate base. See PRIEST, supra note 8, at 89-108; Washington
Water Power Company v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 101 Idaho 567, 617 P.2d 1242 (1980).
34. AG v. NMPSC, 685 P.2d at 957.
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(A) (1978).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-6-4(C) (1978).
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4(A) (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4 (1978); State v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950); Southern Union Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 330, 503 P.2d 310 (1972); Hobbs Gas Company v. N.M. Public Serv.
Comm., 94 N.M. 731, 616 P.2d 1116 (1980); Mountain States Tel. v. N.M. Corp. Comm., 90
N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-6-4(C) (1978).
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utility company, is the largest electric utility in New Mexico. PNM operates several electricity generating plants in New Mexico, including San
Juan Generating Station. San Juan Generating Station is completely supplied by coal mined at the site of the plant., Before 1980, Western Coal
Company (WCC) owned and operated the mine. WCC was jointly owned
by PNM and Tucson Electric Power Company, each owning half.39 All
the coal requirements of San Juan Generating Station were met by WCC,
and WCC sold coal to no other company.'
In 1980, PNM requested a rate increase based upon 1980 operating
expenses, which included amounts paid WCC for coal. The New Mexico
Attorney General disputed the reasonableness of PNM's expense for purchase of coal for San Juan Generating Station.4 The NMPSC accepted
PNM's evidence regarding the reasonableness of costs and ruled in favor
of the rate increase. The New Mexico Attorney General appealed, and
the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the NMPSC decision, finding
substantial evidence to support the decision.42
PNM used the market price method of calculating reasonableness of
its costs, and the Attorney General urged use of a rate of return method.
The Attorney General's rate of return methodology reflected that WCC's
return on equity capital was 28.87%, compared with PNM's permitted
return of 15.5%. This represented an 86% higher return than that permitted
PNM. The Attorney General calculated the dollar impact on consumers
of the difference between 15.5% and 28.87% to be $1,216,747." 3
In advocating the market price method, PNM presented evidence which
compared WCC's price of coal with prices charged by other companies.
PNM's evidence showed the price WCC charged PNM was less than or
equal to that charged by other comparable enterprises. For PNM, comparable enterprises included other mine-mouth plants, whether or not
affiliated.4"
39. Western Coal Company was sold to Utah International in December 1980. 685 P.2d at 959.
40. There was no railroad or other method of transporting coal to or from San Juan Generating
Station.
41. PNM's purchases of coal from affiliate companies has been the subject of a number of
commissions' hearings. See e.g., In Re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 50 P.U.R. 4th 416, 438 (1982);
Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. F.E.R.C., 628 F.2d 1267 (10 Cir. 1980).
42. AG v. NMPSC, 685 P.2d at 957.
43. Brief for Appellant at xv, AG v. NMPSC.
44. PNM presented Rebuttal Exhibit E, a listing of prices, expressed in cents per MMBTU, for
approximately 50 mine-mouth coal operations across the country. The exhibit included both affiliated
and non-affiliated coal operations. According to PNM's calculations, the average price of coal for
affiliated operations was 99.5 cents per MMBTU. The average price for mine-mouth operations
involving independent entities was 99.2 cents per MMBTU. PNM's average price of coal during
the same time frame, 1980, was 86.5 cents per MMBTU. From this data, PNM argued its expenses
were reasonable because its price for coal was less than the national average for arm's length
transactions. See e.g. Brief of Appellee at 12-16, AG v. NMPSC.
The Attorney General faulted PNM's exhibit for including coal operations nationwide, rather than
being limited to the southwestern market. Even more importantly, the Attorney General noted the
exhibit did not indicate whether the prices shown were deemed reasonable and allowed to be passed
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The Attorney General pointed out difficulties with PNM's methodology.
The Attorney General argued that the reason for using a market or comparable price is to determine a fair market price. Since WCC could not
transport coal in or out of the area, no real competitive market existed.
Therefore, the Attorney General argued, comparison to another enterprise
only simulated a competitive market and was meaningless.
The Attorney General's criticisms did not prevail. The NMPSC accepted PNM's exhibit regarding comparable enterprises without requiring
any modification of the evidence.45 Based upon these comparable enterprises, the commission determined that prices were reasonable and granted
the rate increase.
The issues and debate faced by the NMPSC are not unique. Other state
regulatory commissions experience the same difficulty in choosing the
appropriate method for establishing reasonable rates. Examples of the
approaches other jurisdictions have taken in applying the market price
and rate of return methods are discussed in the next two sections.
MARKET PRICE APPROACH
In a 1980 case, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the Idaho Public
Utilities Commission's (IPUC) regulatory authority to choose a methodology for determining reasonableness. 46 Washington Water Power Company (WWP) applied for a rate increase based in part on the price of coal
purchased from its wholly-owned subsidiary, Washington Irrigation and
Development Company (WIDCo), and used for electricity generation at
Centralia Plant.47
The IPUC determined that WWP failed to show the price of coal
purchased from WIDCo was reasonable. Although IPUC stated it was
not abandoning the market price method, it fixed a price for the coal at
a level which allowed WIDCo a 13.25% rate of return, the same rate of
return permitted WWP.48
on to ratepayers. The Attorney General noted six of the listed companies were not permitted to pass
through all costs. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 26, AG v. NMPSC.
45. The NMPSC is not obligated to accept the evidence presented by the utility. For example,
the commission could have excluded certain prices of "comparable enterprises" if it found the
enterprise not to be, in fact, comparable to WCC. The obvious result would be to alter the average
price with which PNM compared WCC's price.
46. Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm., 101 Idaho 567, 617 P.2d 1242
(1980).
47. PP&L owns 47.5% and WWP owns 15% of the Centralia Plant, and six other companies
own lesser amounts of the remainder. Id. at 1244.
All of Centralia's coal requirements were purchased from WIDCo under long term contract. The
contract provided for certain automatic price adjustments for such circumstances as labor cost, tax
or regulatory increases. Id. at 1245.
48. IPUC worked out the mechanics of this without directly regulating WIDCo. IPUC took WWP's
15% ownership in Centralia, supported solely by WIDCo's 50% ownership of the mine and found
that 30% of WIDCo's earnings were based on coal purchases by WWP. IPUC then took 30% of
WIDCo's earnings that were above the 13.25% figure and added it to the net operating income of
WWP. Id.
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On appeal, the supreme court reviewed the evidence introduced by
WWP and the IPUC's findings.49 The court found substantial evidence
supporting the IPUC's findings that the price comparisons were meaningless.5" The court also agreed that WIDCo's level of risk was no greater
than WWP's.5
However, the court disagreed with IPUC's findings that transactions
were not at arm's-length. The court emphatically stated it would not
assume collusion in a non-affiliated transaction. The court concluded
IPUC failed to make sufficient findings as to the lack of arm's-length
negotiations.
More importantly, the court disagreed with the IPUC's analysis of the
relevance of arm's-length transactions. The IPUC argued that the presence
of arm's length negotiations was not the critical issue; rather, the level
of earnings of the affiliate as compared with the utility was the critical
factor. "The wholly owned affiliate should be in the same position as an
integrated producing arm of a utility.""
However, the court reasoned that the IPUC was implicitly using a rate
of return method without adopting it,54 and the market price approach
should not be concerned with comparing earnings between the affiliate
and utility. Under the market price method, the affiliate's earnings should
be compared with similar enterprises. Based upon these concerns, the
49. On appeal, IPUC contended its decision was proper under either the rate of return or market
price methodology. However, because the Idaho Supreme Court found that the IPUC had not clearly
advocated adoption of the rate of return method or made sufficient findings in support of adopting
that method, the court limited its review of the IPUC's decision to analysis under the market price
method. Id. at 1251.
WIDCo's evidence in support of reasonable price included five main points. First, WIDCo charged
a price for coal that was one-half that of the nearest alternative supplier. Second, the price per BTU
charged by WIDCo was less than the national average per BTU. WIDCo's price was 71.7 cents per
million BTUs; the national average was 93.6 cents per million BTUs. Third, WWP did not vote on
WIDCO's price adjustments; price was negotiated between WIDCo and the six owners. Fourth,
WIDCo lost money on coal sales for three years and only realized a 3.07% return on its average
investment between 1972 and 1976. Fifth, WWP asserted that there was a greater level of investor
risk for the mining operations than for WWP's utility operations. Id.
50. The IPUC found the price comparisons meaningless because of the differences between the
mines. For example, the transportation costs of the nearest alternative supplier of coal to the Centralia
plant were double those of WIDCo, and if transportation costs were eliminated from the calculation,
the alternative supplier would have a lower price. IPUC also criticized the use of the national average
price, because it included underground mines and mines with extensive overburden, as well as all
transportation costs. Id.
51. WIDCo's original acquisition of the coal was intended to supply the power plant, and WIDCo
had a guaranteed market with a long-term contract that included regular price increases. There were
no transportation costs and no effective competition. Id. at 1251-52.
52. The IPUC had been suspicious about the fact that both WWP and WIDCo shared the same
president. Further, IPUC found no reason to assume that any persons who voted on the price of
WIDCo coal would watch out for the interests of WWP's consumers, and therefore the automatic
price increases would not be opposed. The court, however, noted the other owners of the Centralia
Plant had no connection with WWP. Id. at 1252.
53. Id., quoting IPUC Order No. 13963.
54. According to the court, IPUC stated it was not "abandoning" the traditional approach, but
also determined its findings were justifiable under either the traditional or rate of return method. Id.
at 1251.
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court found the IPUC order to be unsupported by sufficient findings or a
clear choice of methodology, and the court set aside IPUC's order.55
In 1983, the Idaho Supreme Court overturned the IPUC's subsequent
explicit use of the rate of return method.56 The court again conceded
IPUC had authority to choose a standard for determining reasonableness,
that there was substantial evidence to support the IPUC's findings that
arm's-length negotiations were not controlling on the issue of reasonable
price57 and that no competitive market existed." However, in this instance,
the court found IPUC's application of the rate of return method arbitrary.5 9
According to the court, the central issue in deciding whether to treat
the affiliate the same as the utility is the extent of vertical integration.
"[W]here a utility enjoys an integrated position and market dominance,
it 'should not be permitted to break up the utility enterprise by the use
of affiliated corporations and thereby obtain an increased rate of return
for its activities.' "" The court found the pricing relationships and supply
55. The court did pronounce that notwithstanding a 1970 IPUC ruling that WIDCo bonds and
contracts were not subject to IPUC jurisdiction, the IPUC could now decide to limit WIDCo's
earnings. In support of this position, the court quoted DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 18.09 610 (1958):
When the purpose is one of regulatory action, as distinguished from merely applying
law or policy to past facts, an agency must at all times be free to take such steps as
may be proper in the circumstances irrespective of its past decisions. Even when
conditions remain the same, the administrative understanding of those conditions may
change, and the agency must be free to act.
617 P.2d at 1254.
Further, once the IPUC found prices unreasonable, it was free to adjust the price. Since there was
substantial evidence that WIDCo carried no greater risk than WWP, the IPUC would not be abusing
its discretion if it chose to limit WIDCo's rate of return to the same level as WWP.Id.
56. Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm., 105 Idaho 276, 668 P.2d
1007 (1983).
57. Id. at 1010.
58. IPUC found no competitive market because 1) WIDCo was guaranteed all sales of coal to
Centralia through a long-term contract setting price and allowing automatic price increases when
WIDCo's expenses increase; 2) Westmoreland Resources, located in southeastern Montana, is the
nearest alternative supplier; however, delivered price would be $33.40 per ton, compared with $14.86
per ton from WIDCo; and 3) Centralia is located at the site of WIDCo's mine, and was designed
to bum coal from the WIDCo mine; to utilize other coal may require modification of Centralia's
boilers. Id.
59. The court explicitly noted that there may be times when use of the rate of return approach
is appropriate:
Where an electrical utility has created a separate corporate identity for its whollyowned coal supply operation, and where that subsidiary continues as an integrated part
of the unified production and distribution function of the utility, it would not be
unreasonable or arbitrary for the Commission to combine the subsidiary's ratebase,
income and expenses with those of the utility for rate-making purposes.
Id. at 1011.
The court recognized that underlying a choice to treat the utility and its subsidiary the same is a
recognition that sometimes only the names are distinct, and, further, the subsidiary coal company
operates with a guaranteed buyer for its coal and a non-competitive environment. The value of price
comparisons is eliminated, and unless the subsidiary coal company can show factors which result
in its operating at a higher risk than the utility, it is reasonable to assume that a return that is fair
for the utility is fair for the subsidiary. Id.

Fall 1986]

REGULATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

arrangements did not warrant application of the rate of return method
6
because WIDCo operated at a different level of risk than its parent utility. '
The court reversed IPUC's choice of the rate of return method and remanded for a determination by the IPUC of a fair rate of return for
WIDCo. The rate of return figure would then be used to determine the
amount of WWP's coal expenses that should be included in its operating
costs for rate-making purposes, pursuant to a market price method.
The Wyoming Public Service Commission (WPSC) has also opted for
a market price method in determining rates for the Jim Bridger Plant.62
Pacific Power & Light (PP&L) owns two-thirds of the plant, and PP&L's
affiliate, Pacific Minerals, supplies coal to the plant. PP&L presented
evidence its expenses for coal fell below the market price of similar coal
purchases. The WPSC rejected independent staff's suggestion that no
comparison of similar operations was possible and determined the utility's
coal expense was reasonable. 63
RATE OF RETURN APPROACH
A number of jurisdictions apply a rate of return methodology. This
often occurs when a public service commission determines a utility's
expense is unreasonable. Subsequent to determining that an expense is
unreasonable, the commission sets an appropriate cost level equivalent
to a certain rate of return.
The Montana Public Service Commission (MPSC) has statutory authority to regulate operations of public utilities and provide for just and
reasonable rates.' The extent of jurisdiction over utility transactions with
affiliates is not expressly developed in the Montana Code, although the
MPSC chooses the methodology for determining rates.65
For a number of years, Montana has grappled with choosing an approach to regulating transactions between utilities and affiliates. In the
most recent Montana case on this issue, the Montana Supreme Court
upheld a MPSC decision which disallowed a portion of Montana Power
Company's rate increase request based on application of a rate of return
methodology.'
Montana Power Company purchases 100% of the coal requirements
60. Id. at 1011, quoting Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm., 617 P.2d
at 1248.
61. In analyzing the extent of vertical integration, the court found the pricing relationship between
WIDCo and WWP, which involved six other non-affiliated companies, to be important. WIDCo was
not the supplier of coal solely to WWP, but actually supplied coal to a plant owned by eight companies.
668 P.2d at 1012.
62. 54 P.U.R. 4th 129, 135 (1983).
63. Id. at 136-37.
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-330 (1985).
65. Id.
66. Montana Power Co. v. Dep't of Public Service Regulation, 665 P.2d 1121 (Mont. 1983).
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for its coal-fired generators from Western Energy Company, a whollyowned subsidiary of Montana Power Company. Sales to Montana Power
Company account for 15% of Western's sales; the remainder is sold to
other utilities and manufacturing companies. 67
The Montana Consumer Council suggested a rate of return methodology
and introduced evidence that Western Energy Company's profit level was
over 20% on equity capital, compared with 13.5% for other coal companies. In contrast, Montana Power Company advocated a market price
approach. The company attempted to prove its prices were reasonable
through evidence that nine companies had bid on the Billings coal-fired
plant, and Western's was the lowest bid. Montana Power Company argued
that the price charged by Western Energy represented a competitive market
price. The MPSC used a rate of return methodology in reaching its
decision.68
The supreme court deferred to the judgment of the MPSC, reasoning
that the MPSC has statutory authority to regulate the operations of utilities
and their rates.69 The MPSC has authority to select the methodology used
in determining reasonableness. 7" The MPSC chose to adopt the rate of
return method, and the court found there was substantial evidence to
support the decision.7"
This decision contrasted with a 1981 decision in which the supreme
court reversed a MPSC decision also based upon a rate of return approach.7 2 In the earlier decision, Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU)
filed for an electric rate increase, based in part on expenses for coal
purchased from MDU's wholly-owned subsidiary, Knife River Coal Company (Knife River)."
The MPSC found the coal expenses excessive and used a rate of return
method to establish reasonableness. The MPSC determined the 33.43%
rate of return earned by Knife River was excessive. It limited the permissible coal expenses to a level of earnings by Knife River equal to a
12.124% rate of return, the same rate of return permitted MDU.74
67. Id.at 1122.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1123.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1121.
72. Montana-Dakota Utilities Company v. Bollinger, 632 P.2d 1086 (Mont. 1981).
73. Id. at 1087. Under long-term contracts, Knife River supplies 100% of MDU's coal requirements for its coal-fired generators. Sales to MDU account for 34% of Knife River's total sales; the
remainder is sold to other utility and manufacturing companies.
74. Id. The MPSC agreed with Montana Consumer Council's position that no competitive environment existed with which to measure a market price. Therefore, the MPSC chose to utilize the
rate of return approach. The Montana Consumer Council had argued that no competitive market
existed from which to establish a competitive or fair market price. It presented evidence showing:
1) 100% of MDU's coal was supplied by Knife River under long-term contracts; 2) MDU's boiler
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The Montana district court affirmed the MPSC decision. MDU appealed
to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing the MPSC abused its discretion
by applying the rate of return method.75 The Montana Supreme Court
agreed with MDU and vacated the judgment, finding the MPSC choice
of a permissible return arbitrary and unsubstantiated.7 6 According to the
court, Knife River, which transacts a majority of its business with companies other than MDU, operates with different risk factors than the utility,
and should not be limited to the utility's rate of return. The court remanded
the case to the MPSC, strongly suggesting the commission attempt, again,
to find a competitive market price for coal.77
The South Dakota Public Service Commission (SDPSC) took a position
similar to that of the MPSC in regulation of MDU. 78 In South Dakota as
designs required a particular type/grade of coal not readily available from other possible sources; 3)
MDU's generating plants were located at the site of Knife River's mines, giving the coal company
a price advantage because of minimal transportation costs. Id. at 1088.
Montana Consumer Council further argued that MPSC's use of rate of return method was not
regulation of Knife River, which would be outside MPSC's statutory authority. Knife River was not
limited in the price it could charge MDU, nor was there any constraint on the profits Knife River
could make from transactions with other customers. Rather, the effect of the MPSC decision would
be to limit only the allowable expense MDU could pass along to ratepayers. Id. at 1088-89.
75. MDU contended the fundamental issue for the MPSC to determine was whether the price of
coal sold by Knife River to MDU was reasonable. Further, price should be monitored from the point
of view of a "natural resource company operating in the free marketplace, and not in the context
of a regulated public utility." MDU presented evidence that a competitive market existed for coal
and that the price charged by Knife River was no more than the market price. MDU's evidence
supporting this contention was of the following nature: 1) the price charged MDU by Knife River
was lower than the price available from any other source; 2) Knife River charged MDU the same
price it charged its other customers; 3) Knife River's profits were reasonable when measured against
the fair market value of its assets. Id. at 1089.
76. Id. at 1092.
77. Id. at 1092. The Supreme Court clearly stated its preference for the market price approach;
however, the court recognized the MPSC had authority to choose a method. However, the court did
imply that the MPSC could reject the marketplace approach only upon a factual finding. After
directing the MPSC to try to find a competitive price, the court gave further instructions that should
the commission choose to use the rate of return method, it must state a factual basis for the return
allowed Knife River, having considered its assets and the rate of return which other coal companies
in the marketplace receive. Id.
The dissenting opinion attacked these instructions to the commission, stating that the rate of return
method did not rely on reasonableness of prices; but rather, a unitary method of allowing all integrated
parts of the utility to earn the same rate of return. The dissenting opinion attacked the majority for
invading the commission's statutory authority to determine a permissible rate of return. The dissent
argued that absent an unjust or arbitrary result, the court should defer; in this case, the MPSC's
determination that 12.24% return on equity was reasonable for a business such as Knife River, "with
a guaranteed market, a guaranteed monopoly, and a guaranteed profit" was not arbitrary. Id. at 1093.
78. South Dakota law gives the SDPSC explicit authority in rate-making to disallow unreasonable
profits made by affiliates in transactions with utilities. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §49-34A-19.2
(1985) states in pertinent part:
The public utilities commission, in determining the allowance for materials . . . to be
included in costs of operations for rate-making purposes, may disallow any unreasonable profit made in the sale of materials to . . . any public utility by any firm or
corporation owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such utility . . . The burden
of proof shall be on the public utility to prove that no unreasonable profit is involved.
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well as Montana, MDU purchases all coal used to generate electricity
from Knife River.79 In 1976, MDU filed for a rate increase and included
the cost of coal purchased from Knife River as part of its revenue requirements.
In hearings before the SDPSC, MDU attempted to prove a competitive
price existed and was reasonable.8 ° The SDPSC disagreed with MDU's
analysis. The SDPSC did not find a competitive market, and it concluded
MDU did not prove Knife River's profits were reasonable.81 The SDPSC
reduced MDU's revenue requirements by $128,500, the amount it determined to be unreasonable profit. The SDPSC concluded it was reasonable for Knife River's transactions with MDU to be set at a figure
equal to the acceptable rate of return permitted MDU, 11.5%.82
The South Dakota circuit court reversed the SDPSC decision. On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court again reversed, agreeing with the
SDPSC's decision that MDU's profits were unreasonable. 83 The South
Dakota Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the SDPSC

findings that a competitive market did not exist and that prices and profits
were unreasonable."
However, the South Dakota Supreme Court held there was insufficient
79. Sale of coal to MDU constitutes 33% of Knife River's total coal sales; the remaining 67%
of Knife River's sales are made to other utility companies and manufacturers. Application of MontanaDakota Utilities Company for Authority to Establish Increased Rates for Electric Service (F-3126),
278 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Application of MDU].
80. Id. MDU presented evidence that it paid less than other purchasers for coal bought from
Knife River. MDU also argued Knife River's profits should be defined in the context of an unregulated
natural resource company in the free market rather than as a regulated utility. Further, MDU argued
that measuring Knife River's profits against the fair market value of its coal reserves and operating
equipment is the appropriate economic principle to apply. MDU approximated Knife River's return
earned on the fair market value of its assets at 3%, and contended that Knife River's profits were
reasonable for a competitive, exhaustible resource extracting company. Id.
81. Id. Persuaded by testimony about the monopolistic forces and vertical integration experienced
in the coal industry, SDPSC determined that evidence of a comparable price or market price was
insufficient proof of a competitive market. This position was further justified by the SDPSC determination that MDU dominated the local coal market. The SDPSC recognized that the low BTU and
water content of the coal made it useful only within a limited area that neatly included all of MDU's
generating stations.
As further justification, the SDPSC noted Knife River's primary obligation was to provide MDU
with sufficient coal, which supported its determination that Knife River was not operating as an
independent coal company.
Lastly, evidence revealed Knife River developed its coal resources more slowly than other coal
companies; presumably, the court noted, to assure MDU of a continuous supply for its electricity
generating needs. Therefore, MDU's prices were higher than they would be if resources were put
into the market at a faster pace. Id. at 192.
82. Id. Using a cost approach rather than a fair market value, the SDPSC computed a 37.45%
rate of return for the year. Evidence of rates of returns for five independent coal companies showed
a figure of 24.5% for the same year, 1976. SDPSC held the transactions with Knife River to the
11.5% level because the risk factor was different than for an independent company; Knife River's
guaranteed market warranted a lesser rate.
83. Id. at 193.
84. Id.
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evidence to support the SDPSC's conclusion that Knife River ought to
be held to the same rate of return as MDU.85 The court reasoned that
while transactions between utilities and wholly-owned subsidiaries are
subject to close scrutiny, commission authority does not extend to regulation of the coal company. Further, the level of return for Knife River
ought not be set at the same rate as the utility because the coal company
was uniquely dealing with a depletion factor. In contrast, the utility simply
bought its coal in the market and sold electricity to consumers, basing
its rates on basic business costs.86 The supreme court remanded the case
to the SDPSC with instructions to set a rate of return for Knife River at
a level similar to the rate of return earned by the five independent coal
companies sampled by the commission."
Unlike those of most states, Washington statutes include a section that
expressly describes regulation of affiliated interests.8 8 The Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) must approve all transactions between a public utility and an affiliated interest and approval
will only be given if the utility proves the transaction is "reasonable and
consistent with the public interest."8 9
Jim Bridger generating plant, located in Montana, is two-thirds owned
by Pacific Power and Light (PP&L), and one-third owned by Idaho Power
Company (IPC). Bridger Coal Company supplies all the coal for Jim
Bridger station. The coal company is also two-thirds owned by PP&L
and one-third owned by IPC. WUTC views this relationship as "Pacific
• . . selling coal to itself; through the subsidiary relationships, the financial statements of PP&L reflect the operations of Bridger Coal and the
risks associated with that operation are perceived by investors evaluating
Pacific's securities. '
In determining reasonableness of coal costs, the WUTC's approach
was to consider the financial benefits PP&L received from Bridger Coal's
earnings. 9 The commission considered the costs to PP&L, through sub85. Id.
86. A dissenting opinion focused attention, among other things, on the fact that sales to MDU
comprise only 34% of Knife River's total volume of sales. These sales to other utilities and companies
reflect arm's-length negotiations. Further, the testimony concerning the five companies was not
sufficiently detailed to draw the conclusion that Knife River's prices were above the upper limit of
a reasonable rate of return. Because of these points, the dissent found that Knife River's prices were
competitive and argued that the SDPSC must, therefore, use competitive price to measure reasonableness. Id. at 194.
87. Id. at 193-4.
88. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.16.010-090 (1962).
89. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.16.020 (1962).
90. Washington Utilities and Transportation Comm'n v. Pacific Power and Light, 51 P.U.R. 4th
158, 170 (1983).
91. Id. at 171. PP&L disagreed that any kind of adjustment was necessary, because the price
paid for coal was no higher than any other coal available to the Jim Bridger plant or higher than
anything available to other plants under similar circumstances. Id.
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sidiaries, of producing coal which it then purchased. The commission
found that in 1981, Pacific Minerals, a PP&L subsidiary which operates
the Bridger coal mine, earned 75.11% return on common equity and
36.5% return on overall capital. 92
The commission more clearly articulated its general regulatory principles when reconsidering this issue in March, 1983. 9" The commission
reasserted the propriety of treating the affiliate and the utility as one
integrated company. PP&L contended its price comparisons proved its
prices were favorable to ratepayers. The WUTC emphatically stated that
analysis of these comparisons was not controlling. The commission found
it more compelling to examine the cost of the coal, including the profits.
According to the WUTC, PP&L had failed to show that the affiliate's
75% return on equity was reasonable. "The commission method recognizes the cost of capital to the affiliate, is based upon sound economic
analysis, and properly limits excessive earnings by the affiliate." 94
ANALYSIS
Public service commissions face the task of balancing the interests of
the ratepayer and the utility, as well as the general public interest. Given
this directive of regulatory law, commissions must set rates that are
reasonable. Thus, in the first instance, the cases discussed above reflect
attempts by commissions or courts to decide whether the price paid by
the utility was reasonable. A commission's choice of methodology is
simply an attempt to answer this difficult, yet fundamental question.
Market Price Method
Use of market price methodology has taken several forms: 1) comparison of the price the utility paid to the affiliate with the prices charged
by other actual competitors; 2) comparison of price with similar operations
of companies that are not actually competitors; and 3) comparison of
profit levels between the affiliate company and other companies.
A number of jurisdictions prefer the market price approach. There are
several reasons for this preference. First, a simulated or actual competitive
environment is said to encourage utility efficiency. Mine-mouth operations
tend to exhibit economies of location as well as economies of operating
and maintenance expenses. Permitting a utility company to realize benefits
of these economies encourages that type of activity and planning.95 Second, commissions are accustomed to regulating the utility company sep92. Id.
93. Washington Utilities and Transportation Comm'n v. Pacific Power and Light, 52 P.U.R. 4th
148, 150 (1983).
94. Id.at 151.
95. COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, supra note I, at 110-113.
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arately from its affiliate. Separate corporate affiliated entities tend to be
treated separately in the law. Whereas commissions can directly reach
the activities of a utility, they can only indirectly reach the affiliate's
activities. Also, treating an affiliated resource-extracting company similarly to a service-providing utility requires a conceptual artifice. Third,
commissions are comfortable with market-type analyses of problems because regulation of these natural monopolies is based upon a competitive
model .96

However, there are difficulties with a market-type approach, difficulties
that relate to the structure of the industry. Use of the market price approach
assumes the existence of a competitive market. Often, this is not the
case. The coal industry is highly concentrated, and coal mining operations
are very individualized. Differences among coal mining operations are
vast. Such differences include: transportation variables, coal quality, types
of mines, quantity of supply, overburden costs, regulatory/environmental
requirements among different states, reclamation, capital equipment,
transmission costs, i.e. distance between generating station, and electric
load.
In certain instances, these differences are insurmountable. For example,
transportation barriers made WCC the only reasonable supplier of coal
to San Juan Generating Station. Yet even when it appears that an alternative supplier exists, the transportation costs can be so high that actual
cost of coal delivered to the plant by the alternative supplier eliminates
any real competition with the mine located at the mouth of the plant.
It is extremely difficult to find a competitive environment which resembles what is commonly imagined as a free market situation. Most
coal is sold under long-term contracts, often with fixed prices and regular
increases. With mine-mouth operations, the coal resource is developed
to meet specific and nearly guaranteed needs. Transactions do not reflect
a competitive model where scarcity and changing demand drive price and
resulting allocation of natural resources. Thus, a market price for coal,
based upon an actual market, is a fiction.
Using the market price approach where competitive markets do not
exist is impractical and favors the utility by allowing it to keep the benefit
of any efficiencies it may realize without passing on those benefits to
consumers. Many jurisdictions have responded to this problem by developing a simulated or constructed market. Briefly, this construction
involves comparing the price paid by the utility to the price charged in
a similar market. If the price paid is at or below that which is charged
96. There has been a long-standing debate over the proper function of utility regulation: whether
regulation ought to encourage simulated competition or some other economic model. The traditional
perspective on utility regulation utilizes a competitive model. See generally PRIEST, supra note 8;
see also, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 114-118.
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for a comparable operation, the price is deemed reasonable. This is the
kind of evidence PNM successfully presented to the NMPSC in AG v.
NMPSC.97 PNM's price comparisons were from other mines located at
or near the site of the generating station. The comparisons included both
affiliated and non-affiliated operations.
By using this method, problems of trying to find an actual competitive
environment are avoided. However, this approach is also subject to strong
criticism. First, it is even further removed from true competitive behavior,
and the traditional process of determining whether prices are reasonable
assumes a market or market value operates to give a reference point for
the reasonableness of price. Second, in an industry so highly concentrated
vertically integrated, the price structure may begin at an already inflated
point, because the price does not involve any sort of actual market value.
Third, attempts to find a comparable market have been the subject of
great controversy. As discussed above, there are many variable factors
that enter into each coal mining operation, which make comparisons
difficult.
Rate of Return Method
The rate of return methodology has also taken several forms. Some
jurisdictions view the utility/affiliate relationship as one integral corporate
structure, and set one common rate of return. Other jurisdictions set a
rate of return for the transaction at a level comparable to that of other
independent coal companies.
There are a number of reasons some jurisdictions prefer the rate of
return methodology. The industry is highly concentrated and vertically
integrated, resulting in a situation where there is no external competitive
price or market. The rate of return approach recognizes this and sets
standards divorced from the competitive model. A rate of return approach
does not allow the utility to benefit from a corporate structure that only
appears to set up independent companies, when the affiliate actually has
the same interests as the utility. The utility is less able to hide unfair
profits under this approach, which is one of the underlying concerns that
commissions have with affiliate/utility transactions. Further, there is the
sense that ratepayers ought to receive some of the benefits that the utility
is reaping through its integrated corporate structure.
However, there are also problems with the rate of return approach,
particularly in its "pure" form. A significant disadvantage is that utilities
have less incentive to pursue efficiencies if they cannot capture the benefits. Thus, in the long run, it may not be more beneficial to consumers.
The rate of return approach primarily assumes the corporate structure is
97. 68 P.2d 957; see supra note 44.
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one integral unit and ought to be treated that way. However, although
the affiliate company is very closely connected to the utility, a number
of factors raise the issue whether the interests or risk factors of the different
companies are identical or sufficiently connected to warrant unified treatment. For example, if the affiliate company sells 75% of its coal to the
utility and 25% to other companies, it may not be proper to say the
interests are identical. Arguably, a service-providing company is fundamentally different from a company extracting a depleting natural resource.
Also, as noted above, commissions are accustomed to treating the corporate entities separately. The rate of return approach brings the commission closer to what appears to be regulation of the affiliate company.
Commissions consider this outside the scope of authority conferred by
statute, and are cognizant of the difficulties of finding and applying appropriate expertise.
CONCLUSION
The cases analyzed in this comment show modifications of a pure
application of either the market price or rate of return methodology. The
modified approaches, such as a constructed market or a rate of return set
at the level of other resource companies, represent attempts by the commissions and courts to utilize the advantages of each methodology. The
methods attempt to encourage utilities to pursue greater efficiency, while
allowing the consumer to benefit from these efficiencies. Reasonableness
must be determined in the context of balancing the interests of the ratepayer, the utility, and the general public. It is this balance which the
commissions are trying to find through these modified approaches.
JANE MARX

